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29 December 1952

TO : Assistant Deputy Director/Administration (Inspection & Security)

SUBJ: Report on Central Intelligence Agency Participation in the Air Raid Drill Staged by District of Columbia Civil Defense Authorities on 12 December 1952

Set forth below is a report of Central Intelligence Agency participation in the air raid drill held on 12 December 1952. The report is divided into four parts, consisting of

1. A description of the system of Civil Defense organized in the District of Columbia and an explanation of how we fit into it;
2. A description of the various methods of sounding alarms within the Central Intelligence Agency buildings;
3. An account of the practice air raid drill itself;
4. Our conclusions based upon all of the foregoing.

I

District of Columbia Civil Defense Organization

The District of Columbia Civil Defense organization is established by law and is headed by Inspector John E. Fondahl, formerly of the Metropolitan Police Department. He has two deputies, one of whom is responsible for the planning, organizing, and carrying out of civil defense measures for the Washington populace at large, and the other of whom is responsible for civil defense measures in Government buildings and among the workers who occupy them during duty hours. This latter deputy is Mr. Ferdinand Kaufholz, Jr., who occupies the position ex officio by reason of his being Regional Director of the General Services Administration for Region 3, Public Buildings Service, which includes Washington. Mr. Kaufholz exercises his responsibility as

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Deputy Director of Civil Defense for the District of Columbia through the Civil Defense Branch of General Services Administration, which consists of Mr. Charles B. Overman, Chief, Messrs. Genung and Angell, deputies, and others. They have civil defense jurisdiction over all Government buildings in the District of Columbia, including those occupied by Central Intelligence Agency.

The Civil Defense Branch of General Services Administration mentioned above is, therefore, actually under the jurisdiction of and is part of Inspector Fondahl's District of Columbia Civil Defense organization and is bound by its plans, policies, and orders. We are obligated to participate in the program on this basis along with other Governmental agencies, although I have in fact made arrangements with the Civil Defense Branch for our participation in the program in such a way that it will not conflict with our own security requirements and regulations.

## II

### Central Intelligence Agency Building Alarms

The installation and maintenance of alarm and signal systems within our buildings, as well as the prescribing of the manner of their use, is under the jurisdiction of the General Services Administration and not that of the Central Intelligence Agency. The means of making known a state of alarm (whether fire drill or air raid drill) is by no means uniform throughout the buildings. Most of the buildings have within them electric bells which are reserved exclusively for the signaling of fire drills. Some of the buildings which are thus equipped also have electrical horns or klaxons which are designated as the air raid alarm signals. However, there are still other buildings (including the Administration Building) which do not as yet have the bells, but which do have the horns, in which cases the horns are deemed to be fire alarm signals in lieu of the missing bells and, therefore, are reserved exclusively for the signaling of fire alarms, by order of the GSA Fire Service. Consequently, these horns cannot be used as air raid alarm signals. In such buildings, we have had to resort to the use of police whistles blown by the building wardens for the signaling of air raid alerts. We have had to do this also in the buildings which have fire alarm bells, but no horns at all.

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This expedient bears the approval of the Civil Defense Branch, which has informed us that many other Government buildings outside of Central Intelligence Agency buildings are in the same situation. The conditions described above make for confusion, but we have undertaken to avoid this insofar as is possible, by careful instruction of the building air raid wardens and coordination with the guard forces under Captains [ ]

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A city-wide signal system, which has its control center in the District of Columbia Civil Defense headquarters and which is designed to transmit the yellow, the red, and white alert signals by means of flashing lights installed in a central point within each building, has been set up. However, there are but four outlets for this system within the Central Intelligence Agency buildings, one each in "I" Building, "Q" Building, Quarters "I", and Administration Building. We have issued instructions to the guards on duty at these four locations to call other designated buildings immediately by telephone and pass on to them the existence of a state of alert, as soon as it is flashed over the system. In certain of the buildings equipped with this light system, the signaling of the alert from the Civil Defense control post automatically causes the air raid alarm horns to blow without any action on the part of anyone in the building. In addition, the air raid alarm horns in certain other buildings are automatically operated upon the flashing of the alert by the light system, as, for example, the horns in "J", "K", and "L" Buildings, which all blow automatically upon the flashing of the light at the guard headquarters in "I" Building.

### III

#### The Air Raid Drill

[ ] (of the Physical Security Branch, I&SO) and I attended a meeting called by Mr. Kaufholz, Deputy Director of Civil Defense for the District of Columbia, on 17 November 1952. Representatives of all Government agencies in Washington and vicinity attended this meeting to hear an explanation of the practice air raid drill set for 12 December 1952. Participation in this drill was required by the terms of an order signed by President Truman on 11 November 1952.

Subsequent to the 17 November 1952 meeting, I had a series of conferences with Mr. Angell, Deputy Chief of the General Services

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Administration Civil Defense Branch, in which I laid out the terms for Central Intelligence Agency participation in the drill to the very fullest extent compatible with our own security requirements. Among other things, it was agreed that no outside supervision would be exercised over our participation in the drill, such as the sending of noncleared observers or other such persons into our buildings. It was further agreed that the requirement for submitting direct reports to the Civil Defense control post by the individual wardens of the buildings would not apply to our Agency, but that, instead, I would submit one consolidated report on behalf of the whole Agency following the drill, and that I would submit certain simulated reports to the control post during the progress of the command post exercise following the drill.

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Meanwhile, [ ] conferred with the chief building warden of every one of the buildings which we occupy, in order to insure that their plans were in workable shape. On 4 December 1952, I held a meeting of all the chief building wardens in the auditorium of Central Building, and reviewed the whole situation with them to make sure that they understood their instructions, and, with the assistance of [ ], answered their questions.

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Throughout all of the conferences and meetings which we held on the subject, we emphasized security as the primary consideration to be borne in mind throughout the air raid drill and all preparations therefor. We wanted, of course, to have the process of evacuating the personnel to the shelter areas carried out as efficiently and as expeditiously as possible for the benefit of the safety of the personnel, but we wanted above all else to have this done only after all classified materials were completely and thoroughly secured.

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I made arrangements to have Room 2, Administration Building, open for business during the air raid drill and manned by [ ] of the Office of Communications, with [ ] present as representative of the Inspection and Security Office. We also made careful advance arrangements with the captains of the various guard units which furnish guards to CIA buildings, in an endeavor to insure uniformity of instructions to the guards in the buildings governing their role in the drill. We devised telephone alerting schedules for the guard headquarters of those four buildings which

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have the signal light systems, in order to provide for their alerting the rest of the buildings by telephone. We instructed the guards to permit the entry of anyone having proper CIA admittance credentials at any time during the drill, but to exclude all other persons. Similarly, we provided that any person possessing such CIA credentials and having urgent need to leave the building during the drill would be permitted to do so, after the guard had taken the precaution to remind him that there was, in fact, an air raid drill in progress. In such cases, the guards were instructed to take the name of the individual concerned, in order that we might later make a check to determine whether or not he had legitimate reasons for leaving the building. No such instances were reported.

We made arrangements with the Security Patrol to have its members act as observers of the progress of the drill as an incidental to performing their own duties in connection with the deployment of the Security Patrol. The Security Patrol platoon leaders made their official reports to the commander of the Patrol, through its adjutant, and we have had the benefit of copies of these reports for use in the preparation of this analysis of the effectiveness of the drill.

Several days in advance of the drill, I called, personally, upon the officer responsible in each Office under DD/Plans, DD/Intelligence, Director of Training, and AD/Communications, for the implementation of the emergency relocation plan, and requested that they impart instructions by word of mouth to each member of the Emergency Force to the effect that they would participate in the air raid drill in the same manner and to the same extent as all other personnel of the Agency. This was done as a precaution to insure that no member of the Emergency Force would unwittingly reveal its existence by failing to participate in the drill or, worse still, by attempting to proceed to the Emergency Relocation Center upon the sounding of the alarm. In this connection, it must be observed that we have still to work out the precise role the Emergency Force members will play in future air raid drills to insure that they will be ready to proceed to the Emergency Relocation Center in event of actual emergency, but will not unwittingly make a revelation during a simulated one. We are working on this problem now.

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On 12 December 1952, the practice air raid drill was held. At 1:50 p.m., the yellow alert was signaled; at 2:00 p.m., the red alert was signaled, and at 2:15 p.m., the white alert or "all clear" was signaled.

The details of precisely what took place in each building will not be recounted in this report, although we have a record of them from the individual reports rendered, at our request, by each of the building wardens. Instead, we shall confine this report to a resume of the over-all progress and value of the drill.

Reports of the chief building wardens, plus those of the members of the Security Patrol, and our own observations, indicated that the drill was, in general, a success. Its principal value was twofold: namely, it broke the ice and gave everyone a feeling of awareness of air raid drills as a part of today's pattern of living and, secondly, and more important still, it pointed out to us the many obstacles and deficiencies which must be overcome in the process of providing adequate protection to our personnel in event of actual enemy attack.

The time required for complete evacuation of each building, from the instant of the signaling of red alert, varied from one to ten minutes, depending principally upon the means of giving the alarm within the building concerned. The over-all average time required for all of our buildings was 3.75 minutes. These figures tend to lose their significance, however, when it is considered that this drill was staged at a time certain, which time was well known by all concerned for days in advance of the sounding of the alarms. It is not a realistic index of what will happen when an unannounced air raid drill is staged.

The building warden service participated capably and effectively in all of our buildings. The mechanical means of sounding the alarm did not, in general, function quite so well. There were many reported instances where even under optimum conditions, the horns could not be heard in certain areas in certain buildings. There were other buildings, notably, the Riverside Stadium and                     , where the volume and tone of the horns were such that they blended with, or were drowned out by, the sound of machinery

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operated within the buildings. In "Q" Building, it was reported that, because of a complete mechanical failure, the horns did not sound at all and the signal was given by the guards' whistles. In the Recreation and Service Building, a fuse blew out in the signaling system just at the outset of the sounding of the alarm, and the horns remained silent for two minutes while an electrician, who happened, fortunately, to be on the scene, installed a new fuse to make them sound. At 2210 E Street, N.W., the yellow alert signal was received at the designated time, but, at 2:00 p.m., when the red alert signal should have come through, a second yellow alert was received instead, which meant that the wardens and building personnel stood by to go into their designated shelters, but never received the proper signal to do so. Investigation revealed that the fault in this case lay in the fact that the building at 2210 E Street, N.W., is, administratively, a part of the Department of State group of buildings, and, consequently, was obliged to participate in its signaling system, where the error was made.

Some difficulty was experienced in many buildings with regard to the physical occupancy of the so-called shelter areas. These areas are designated by the General Services Administration within our buildings, as is the case in all other Government buildings, and, in many instances, do not, in my opinion, afford any actual shelter except in name.

Our views on all of the foregoing matters will be set forth more clearly hereunder in part IV, along with our conclusions, and the remedial actions which we propose to initiate based upon the drill.

On 23 December 1952, I rendered to the Chief of the Civil Defense Branch, General Services Administration, a sterile consolidated report covering our participation in the air raid drill and including statistical information which they will use in the preparation of their over-all report covering all Government buildings without reference to Central Intelligence Agency as such.

#### IV

##### Conclusions

I believe that there should be one light signal system (described above in the second paragraph of part II) installed in every

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Central Intelligence Agency building and tied in with the central alarm system emanating from the Civil Defense control center. I have learned that the cost of installation is \$87.50 per building and that there is thereafter a service and maintenance charge of \$7.50 per month per building. I believe, however, that it is worth the money to have a uniform system capable of simultaneous activation throughout all of our buildings, rather than to have but four of them and to have to rely upon the transmission of the signal from one building to another by telephone. If we do have the light systems installed in all of our buildings, I want to arrange a means for them to be activated independently from within our Agency, as well as from the central signaling system, in order to provide for our staging drills of our own from time to time.

We are going to urge that the General Services Administration install electric bell fire alarms in those of our buildings which do not yet have them, in order to eliminate the confusion incident to using the horns as fire alarms in certain of the buildings when, as a matter of fact, they were installed for the original purpose of signaling air raids, and do, in fact, signal air raids in most of the buildings.

We are going to issue police whistles to all wardens in all buildings for their use in case of power or mechanical failure of the electric horn systems. At the present time, only the wardens in those buildings which do not have horn systems installed are in possession of police whistles.

Notwithstanding the current doctrine on the subject of shelter areas, as enunciated by the Civil Defense Branch, I have grave doubts in my own mind as to the wisdom of assembling large groups of people in the main corridors of the temporary buildings in spaces which have been marked off as shelter areas. Granting that keeping them indoors does effectively shield them from the flash, I fear that they would be pinioned beneath the wreckage of the buildings, which assuredly would collapse under the impact of any substantial blast and would, undoubtedly, ignite immediately thereafter. Under these circumstances, it would appear to me that roofed-over trenches or some similar type shelters outdoors would provide safer refuge than remaining within the buildings. I am going to press this point with the Civil Defense Branch and, if need be, with our contacts in the Federal Civil Defense Administration. However, it must be borne in mind that, unless and until their doctrine on the subject is changed, we must abide by the designated shelter areas and methods which they have prescribed.

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[ ] will at all times in the future maintain a continuing review of the air raid plans of all our buildings in order to remedy defects peculiar to the individual buildings. He will also keep current rosters of the warden organizations in the buildings and will be in contact with the chief building wardens. In this connection, we propose to work out instruction courses in civil defense self-help measures and in first aid and related matters for the wardens in order to have on-the-spot aid facilities available in all the buildings. I have made contact, in this regard, with Colonel Baird, Director of Training, and with [ ], of the staff of the Medical Office. [ ] and I have had preliminary conversations with Mr. Aronoff of the American Red Cross civil defense first aid instruction department aimed at the training of small cadres of our people who can, in turn, act as instructors for the rest of the personnel.

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We are going to study the matter of having air raid drills from time to time in the future, either of our own accord or in coordination with city-wide drills staged by the Civil Defense Branch. However, we will be governed by the principle that too frequent drills are irksome and militate against the orderly transaction of business, but that too long a lapse between drills loses the benefit of keeping the employees air raid conscious and proficient in the matter of participation. With this in mind, we shall devise and put into effect a system of properly spaced, unannounced air raid drills in the future.

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